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We explore the effect of transparency of fiscal institutions on the scale of government and 
gubernatorial popularity using a formal model of accountability. We construct an index of 
fiscal transparency for the American states from detailed budgetary information. With cross-
section data for 1986-1995, we find that - on average and controlling for other influential 
factors - fiscal transparency increases both the scale of government and gubernatorial 
popularity. The results, subjected to extensive robustness checks, imply that more transparent 
budget institutions induce greater effort by politicians, to which voters give higher job 
approval, on average. Voters also respond by entrusting greater resources to politicians where 






It is now generally recognized that political and budgetary institutions influence economic 
and political outcomes (see Alt 2001 for a survey). In fiscal policy, institutions such as 
balanced budget provisions (Alt and Lowry 1994; Poterba 1994; Lowry and Alt 2001), the 
structure of budget processes (von Hagen and Harden 1994), and term limits (Besley and 
Case 1995) have been shown to have real effects on fiscal outcomes.  
Fiscal transparency has also received attention over the past decade as a potential 
solution to problems of fiscal imbalance, rising government debt, and corruption.  Academics 
and practitioners alike see “transparency in government operations … as an important 
precondition for macroeconomic fiscal sustainability, good governance, and overall fiscal 
rectitude.” (Kopits and Craig 1998, 1).
1 Conceptual or empirical analyses of whether and how 
transparency actually affects policy outcomes has not accompanied its popularity in fiscal 
policy circles, however. 
In a recent paper, Ferejohn (1999) provides a theoretical analysis of transparency. He 
argues that increasing transparency facilitates voter control and monitoring of elected 
representatives. This induces greater executive effort that in turn increases the willingness of 
voters to spend resources through the public budgets, leading to increased scale of 
government. We test Ferejohn’s result empirically. Using data on budgetary processes, we 
construct an index of fiscal (or budget) transparency for the American states and investigate 
whether transparency and other institutions such as direct democracy and spending and 
revenue limits have an effect on the scale of government.  We find that fiscal transparency 
indeed does increase the scale of government in American states.
2 
In addition to this direct test of Ferejohn’s hypothesis, we examine his implicit 
argument that transparency increases voter confidence in politicians. Suppose for a moment 





state governor's effort and actions, inducing greater executive effort. When perceived by 
voters, this increases their average job approval rating and thus the political popularity of 
governors, on average, other things equal. We find that the route from transparent institutions 
to larger public fiscal scale does indeed run through higher average gubernatorial popularity.  
This result adds to the literature on gubernatorial voting and popularity in three ways. 
First, it confirms findings in the literature relating retrospective voting for governors to 
economic outcomes and policy variables (Lowry, Alt, and Ferree 1998). Second, that paper 
and others (Powell and Whitten 1993; Nadeau, Niemi, and Yoshinaka forthcoming) argue 
that economic voting is greater where there is more “clarity of responsibility”. Just as 
increased transparency makes it easier for voters to distinguish effort from opportunistic 
behavior or stochastic factors, clarity eases the voter’s task of attributing outcomes to the acts 
of particular politicians. Finally, most of the literature on gubernatorial popularity has 
focused on short-run dynamics (for example, MacDonald and Sigelman 1999). We seek 
instead to explain higher average job performance ratings, over the long run. Thus the 
availability of comparable performance ratings in all states over substantial periods of time 
presents an opportunity to examine long-term state-to-state differences in average executive 
popularity, something generally left unexamined in the "fixed effects" augmenting models of 
the short-run dynamics of popularity.  
The next section reviews an agency model of politics that provides a theoretical 
argument for the impact of fiscal transparency (explicitly) on fiscal policy outcomes and 
(implicitly) on gubernatorial popularity. In subsequent sections we operationalize fiscal 
transparency and present the data for the American states, present the empirical specification 
and the remaining data, and the results. We then discuss robustness issues and possible 
problems of institutional endogeneity. The final section offers some concluding remarks and 





Theory and Hypotheses 
In general “institutions affect behavior primarily by providing actors with greater or 
lesser degrees of certainty about the present and future behavior or other actors … 
enforcement mechanisms for agreements, penalties for defection, and the like” (Hall and 
Taylor, 1996, 939). We take as our point of departure that transparency serves as a way of 
reducing informational asymmetries among political agents, financial markets, and voters, 
whether by providing voters with more information about the actions taken by elected 
politicians (Ferejohn, 1999) or facilitating coordination on balanced budget outcomes 
between political parties alternating in power (Alt, Lassen, and Skilling, 2000). 
Transparency and Political Accountability   
Ferejohn (1999) analyzes a principal-agent model of retrospective voting in which 
political agents can choose to make their actions more transparent to voters and thus more 
controllable in order to attract more resources and support. In the model voters (the 
principals) allocate resources to the politician (the agent) who transforms the tax revenue into 
a pure public good. Voters use the rest of their resources for consumption of a private good 
and thus have an outside option to pursue if the agent's (public) output looks unpromising. 
The agent also designs an information structure with some degree of transparency (strictly, 
the stochastic variability of a signal of action). Transparency is said to be high if the variance 
of the noise part of the signal voters receive is low. Then voters can make inferences about 
the action taken with greater precision, and the degree to which the politician can take 
advantage of asymmetric information for personal benefit is diminished.  
The sequence of actions is as follows. First, having heard the offered degree of 
transparency, voters decide on how much to invest in the public sector. Then, having 
privately observed the state of the world (the realization of a shock, reflecting the agent's 





the agent decides on the level of a productive, but costly, action (or effort). The model is thus 
one of pure moral hazard and voters face a “signal extraction” problem. They can observe 
neither the state of the world nor the action taken by the politician, but only the level of 
public goods provided (the return on investment) and a noisy signal of the action taken by the 
agent. Using these observables they decide whether to re-elect the politician or not based on a 
“firing rule” (that is, a binary choice: keep or throw out).  
The key result is that there are circumstances in which more transparency can make 
the agent (and, obviously, the principal) better off. The intuition of the model is that there are 
equilibria in which more transparent institutions produce lower uncertainty about the sort of 
actions taken by a political incumbent, thus more voter confidence in the incumbent (or in 
voters' ability to distinguish good performance from bad performance), and therefore higher 
investment, which here means willingness to pay higher taxes.  
Thus, the model’s clear, testable implication about the effects of fiscal transparency is 
that more transparent fiscal institutions should lead to an increase in voter confidence in 
politicians which, in turn, should lead to a larger scale of government (voters being more 
willing to hand control of resources to politicians whose actions they can more readily 
observe).  Increasing transparency makes public goods provision more attractive to voters, 
thereby increasing the size of government.  
Trust and Popularity  
The interpretation is that more transparent institutions induce greater effort by 
politicians, which makes voters more willing to entrust politicians with public funds. In this 
particular sense we can say that the effect of transparency is that it enhances politicians’ 
trustworthiness. If that is true, a natural conjecture is that, other things equal, increased 
transparency should increase the average popularity of governors, where approval for the job 





of approval and confidence in incumbents exhausts possible meanings of trust in government, 
but claim that it is a component of trustworthiness. 
Some look for the origins of trust in psychological hard-wiring, others in traits, but 
many believe that at least a necessary condition for trusting someone to act as you want is 
that they have incentives to do so (Hardin forthcoming), which is the case in this model of 
transparency. In this case verifiability could be important. Lupia and McCubbins (1998) 
report an experiment with a signalling model that shows that “increasing the probability of 
verification” is sufficient to transform a non-persuasive speaker into a persuasive one. 
Brennan (1998, p. 204) argues that “trustworthiness is rational only when the degree of 
translucency is appropriately large.” We are not the first to look to fiscal institutions for the 
sources of trust, nor the states the first context in which such effects have been believed to 
exist.
3 In the context of a modern democratic society, however, we argue that there is a 
popularity (approval) bonus for those whose actions are more clearly discernable, on average, 
conditional on performance (and possibly party affiliation).  
Note that it is not obvious how causality runs here. Politicians doing well have 
incentives to give voters a better look, in which case causality is from popularity to 
transparency. If those with larger governments demand stricter accounting practices 
(possible, not obvious), causality is from larger government to transparency. We lack both the 
time series on transparency and satisfactory instruments for it to deal with this but discuss 
some possibilities below. Moreover, the model is demanding in terms of voter awareness. We 
have no direct measures of whether voter information is greater or media transmission of 
information more accurate where institutions are more transparent.  
Direct Democracy  
Ferejohn (1986) shows that if the policy space has more than one dimension, political 





politics is neatly ordered in one dimension (as is characteristic of, for example, northern 
Europe), accountability is higher and, therefore, the public sector larger, whereas where issue 
politics dominate (as is the case, for example, in southern Europe), accountability is low.
4 
Similarly, Besley and Coate (2000) argue that an “unbundling of issues” through voter 
initiatives forces a closer relationship between policy outcomes and citizen's preferences. 
Indeed, it has been shown that the possibility of proposing initiatives has been shown to 
deliver policy outcomes closer to median voter opinion (Gerber 1996; see Lascher et al. 1996 
for conflicting evidence). 
According to this logic, initiatives make it more transparent who does what. If some 
dimensions of the policy space are addressed through direct democracy, voters should be 
happier with the politician as they can control him/her better. So we will see whether states 
having more extensive institutions of direct democracy also - on average - have larger public 
sectors and more popular governors, other things equal. Zax (1990) found, using pooled 
county and state level data, that initiative states have significantly higher levels of public 
spending than non-initiative states and he attributed this to initiatives being more likely to 
advocate increases than reductions in spending.
5 However, Matsusaka (1995) reached the 
opposite conclusion, using state level panel data. 
Transparency 
Transparency indicates how informative is budget documentation. It is the answer to 
questions like “Do the financial statements provide comprehensive, verifiable information?” 
and “Can the reported numbers be believed?” The best definition of fiscal transparency that 
we have found is the following:  
“Fiscal transparency is defined … as openness toward the public at large about 
government structure and functions, fiscal policy intentions, public sector 





timely, understandable, and … comparable information on government 
activities … so that the electorate and financial markets can accurately assess 
the government’s financial position and the true costs and benefits of 
government activities, including their present and future economic and social 
implications.” (Kopits and Craig, 1998, 1) 
Important aspects of transparency include a commitment to non-arbitrary language 
(words and concepts have shared meanings), the possibility of independent 
verification, and more information and justification in fewer documents. 
A series of measures reflecting the transparency of state budget processes are 
available from recent publications by the National Association of State Budget Offices (1995, 
1999) and the National Conference of State Legislatures (1998).
6 These include: 
￿ Is the budget reported on a GAAP (generally accepted accounting practice) basis? 
(Yes = more transparent, if shared language facilitates communication); 
￿ Are there multi-year expenditure forecasts? (Yes = more transparent, since more 
information about plans and the expected consequences of action is disseminated); 
￿ Frequency of budget cycle (Annual = more transparent than biennial, since more 
frequent action means more (frequent) information); 
￿ Are the revenue estimates binding? (Yes = more transparent, since estimates that are 
binding increases the costliness of misleading); 
￿ Does the executive branch have primary responsibility for the revenue forecast? (No 
= more transparent, if it is less likely to be misleading or manipulative); 
￿ Are there multiple appropriations bills? (No = more transparent, if a single location 
facilitates monitoring); 
￿ Does a non-partisan staff write Appropriations bills? (Yes = more transparent, again 





￿ Can the legislature pass open-ended appropriations? (No = more transparent, if this 
means that published figures are closer to ultimate outturns); 
￿ Does the budget include performance measures and are they published? (Yes = 
more transparent, if these create more explicit and therefore shareable standards for 
judging). 
There is considerable variation in the extent to which states have adopted these 
transparency provisions, as Table 1 reveals. Some sort of performance reporting is quite 
common. A commitment to GAAP reporting is less so. The distribution of the number of 
transparent provisions across the states is approximately normal, with the mean number of 
provisions being four.  Of the nine measures of transparency that identified in this paper, the 
maximum number present in any one state is eight. That occurs in Delaware, Georgia, and 
Utah. The minimum number is one (Maine). There is considerable variation in the types of 
measures that are adopted in each state.  
[Table 1 about here] 
Figure 1 shows a map of the American states. States are coded as having low, 
medium, or high transparency. Low transparency states (14 in all) have an index value of less 
than 4, medium transparency states (21 of these) have an index value of 4 or 5, and high 
transparency states (14) have an index value of 6 or greater. Alaska is omitted. No obvious 
partisan, historical, geographical or other clusters appear (at least, that we can think of), so 
the test of Ferejohn's conjecture seems a fair one. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Empirical Specification and Data 
The measure of fiscal transparency is an index that sums the number of transparent 
procedures that each state has. This is a rough measure, but is preferable to controlling for 
each institution separately, given the relatively small number of observations. Our fiscal 





available. Therefore, all non-institutional variables, including governor popularity, are 
measured as 10-year averages (1986-1995). This avoids undue weight being given to 
observations in a particular year. We carried out numerous replications varying the exact 
contents of the transparency index and shortening the period of averaging to confirm that the 
results we report are representative. The regressions below are based on 48 mainland states, 
excluding Alaska and Hawaii, as they are outliers in many dimensions of the data, in 
particular in terms of public finance. 
Scale of Government 
Do transparent financial reporting procedures affect the scale of government, as 
predicted by the model? The estimating equation is 
Scale of government    = fiscal transparency index + real per capita income + state 
unemployment  + southern state dummy + government ideology index + 
spending/revenue limits + e 
The dependent variable, scale of government, is measured in per capita terms in several ways, 
including general and total revenues and spending, in constant dollars. It seems preferable to 
eliminate some effects of price-differences between states, so the measure of scale is deflated 
by the regional consumer price index. We extract from the extensive literature on the size of 
government a list of appropriate control variables. These include some measure of state 
government average partisanship or ideology (Left parties or liberal ideologues prefer bigger 
government on average), demographic variables like age composition (a larger share of very 
young or old "dependents" in the population increases the size of government), and economic 
variables like income growth (associated with larger government) or high unemployment 
(which produces larger government through increased social payments), as well as a dummy 
for fifteen "southern" states with distinctively conservative fiscal policies (Alt and Lowry 





that relate to spending and/or revenue increases. Data coding and sources appear in the 
Appendix.  
Governor popularity  
Popularity data for Governors are taken from the Job Approval Ratings (JAR) 
database, and state fiscal and additional variables are from the State Politics and Policy 
Archive. The JAR database contains a variety of different question types, but we analyze only 
the “Standard job performance question.” In the database, the ratings “Excellent” and “Good” 
have been combined into “Positive” while “Fair” and “Poor” have been combined into 
“Negative.” The dependent variable is the (average) percent rating the governor “positive,” as 
a percentage of all responses. The estimates are based on cross-sectional data, averaged over 
1986-1995. The estimating equation is
7 
popularity  = transparency + balanced budget stringency + growth in real income per 
capita + unemployment + regional CPI + real income per capita [level] + real 
government spending per capita + southern state dummy + divided 
government + gubernatorial term limits + budget surplus + e 
We examine alternative conjectures about institutions by substituting various measures of 
direct democracy and spending and revenue limits for the fiscal transparency index in the 
equations above. Data on initiatives, signature requirements and average number of initiatives 
per cycle is taken from Tolbert, Lowenstein, and Donovan (1998). The 23 initiative states in 
our data are listed in the Appendix.  
The choice of controls for the popularity regression is based on the “VP-function” 
literature (see, e.g., Golden and Poterba, 1980, and Paldam, 1991). These differ from those 
included in the scale of government regression. For example, there is no a priori reason that 
the government ideology variable included in the scale regressions should influence 






Scale of government  
The results for scale of government are shown in Table 2. These results provide 
support for the hypothesis that fiscal transparency leads to a larger scale of government.   
These results for institutional transparency are both statistically significant and substantively 
quite large.  For example, the difference between the least and most transparent states (a 
difference of eight on the transparency index) leads to approximately the same effect on the 
scale of government as the southern state dummy. (Consistent with previous research, we 
find that southern states are associated with significantly lower levels of spending and 
revenue.) Further, the fit of these equations is fairly good, with R
2 values around 0.5.  
[Table 2 about here] 
The four columns of Table 2 differ only in the definition of the dependent variable, 
size of government. Similar results obtain across different measures of spending and revenue. 
Table 2 gives some examples that show that the effect of transparency does not depend on 
whether general or total figures are used, or nominal and constant-price. In short, this result is 
not the artefact of a particular choice of concept for size of government. 
Other coefficients deserve comment.  As expected, government ideology has a strong 
impact on the level of spending.  Left governments (a higher level of the ideology index) 
spend more. Further, revenue limits seem to reduce tax revenues significantly, but spending 
limits do not have a similar, significant effect on spending levels. The other coefficients, 
while signed correctly, are not significant. For example, real per capita income does not have 
a significant effect on the scale of government.  
We also included the initiatives dummy in the fiscal scale regressions (results not 
shown). We find that initiatives are associated with a smaller scale of government, significant 





respectively, but not close to significant for revenues or when deflated with regional prices. 
The results concerning transparency were not affected by our adding the initiatives variable. 
At first glance, then, the initiative does not appear to be a device increasing transparency.  
Popularity  
The results for the popularity regressions are shown in Table 3. They suggest that the 
governor receives more favorable job approval ratings, on average, in states that have higher 
fiscal transparency. Again, the effect is quite large. In the basic specification (first column), a 
unit increase in the transparency index increases average popularity by 1.5 percent, 
independent of other factors.  
[Table 3 about here] 
Throughout, we control for average yearly growth in real per capita personal income, 
state unemployment in percent, the level of real per capita state income, real per capita state 
spending/revenues, regional consumer prices, a southern states indicator, and whether the 
state experienced any divided government from 1986-95. Economic controls have signs 
expected for economic voting: growth is significantly positive, unemployment, and inflation 
significantly negative, as is frequently found in the literature. In addition, the level of real per 
capita personal income has a significantly negative coefficient.  
The southern states variable is never significant, but the government spending/ 
revenue variables have negative coefficients, and are significant at the 5 % level. While 
transparency produces more spending and higher popularity, independent of transparency 
more spending is not more popular. That result resonates in a way with Peltzman (1992), who 
finds voters to be fiscal conservatives. However, we do not find that long-run average 
popularity is significantly and systematically affected by partisan or ideological variables. 
The balanced budget stringency coefficient is negative and highly significant, the 





variable enters positively and significantly. A possible explanation for the results concerning 
balanced budget stringency could be that although governors who obey such requirements 
generate lower interest rates on state government bonds (Lowry and Alt, 2001), balancing the 
budget may require making unpopular decisions that are not offset, in terms of popularity, by 
the lower interest rates. In addition, Crain (2000) shows that states with restrictions on 
carrying forward deficits, which are an important part of balanced budget requirements, have 
higher expenditure volatility, which is disliked by voters. 
The existence of term limits (gubernatorial term limits in 1986) affects popularity 
significantly and negatively. One possible reason for this could be that governors who are not 
up for election due to term limits do not have a reputation to maintain (cf. Besley and Case, 
1995, Table 3). Our result is weaker (coefficient smaller, p-value larger) if we restrict the 
term limits variable to those states actually having a term-limited governor between 1986-
1995, but of course we have fewer observations in that case.
8 
The second column of Table 3 reports the results when a dummy for initiative rights 
is substituted for transparency (the variable equals one when a state has initiatives, zero 
otherwise). The possibility of enacting legislation through voter initiatives has a positive, but 
insignificant effect, on popularity. To determine whether actual usage of the initiative rather 
than statutory rights matters, we also tried using the average number of initiatives proposed 
per cycle since adoption of the initiative, and an interaction variable of initiatives and 
signature requirements, but, again, we find no significant effects (results not shown). 
In the third column, we replace the transparency index with measures of spending and 
revenue limits. Both limit variables contribute to higher popularity, the revenue limit 
coefficient being significant at the 5 % level. When they are included, the spending 
coefficient becomes smaller, so it may be that the limits variables are picking up some of the 





the spending limit coefficient ceases to be significant, while the revenue limit is significant 
only at the 10 % level. There is also some overlap between these limits and the transparency 
index. Each limit added to the model in column 1 reduces the transparency coefficient by 
about 10 per cent. 
Robustness and Endogeneity Issues 
In addition to replications altering the dependent variable, to provide greater 
assurance that the size of government results are robust, replications were carried out using a 
series of different definitions of fiscal transparency, involving removing particular provisions 
from the index. These did not lead to qualitatively different results. Various codings of 
divided government were also included as controls in these regressions. These variables were 
generally not significant but often served to strengthen the fiscal transparency results. 
Moreover, controlling for demographic structure (the "dependency" ratio, shares of old and 
young in the population) weakens the transparency results slightly. The dependency ratio 
itself was never significant, however. 
Similar sensitivity analyses were carried out with respect to the popularity 
regressions. These were also recomputed with each item dropped from the transparency 
index. The p-values of these modified transparency coefficients vary between 0.019 and 
0.114, so the statistical significance of the result in Table 3 is about average for these 
replications. We experimented with different functional forms. An exponential 
transformation of the transparency index improved the fit substantially. We included other 
political control variables such as ideology measures, governor party affiliation, and unified 
government conditional on party, and other economic control variables such as long-term 
outstanding debt. These were not significant and affected neither the significance nor the 





government being endogenously determined, as demonstrated in Table 2 above.
9 This also 
left the results for transparency substantially unaffected. 
To assuage concerns that the long period (1986-95) averaging of variables either 
masks important changes or removes some data too far in time from the institutional 
transparency measures from 1995 on, we recomputed the 1986-95 results in Table 3 for the 
subperiods 1990-95 and 1992-95. The three subperiod measures are very highly correlated, as 
one would expect. The estimated effect of transparency on popularity is strengthened when 
employing the 1990-95 average, and even further when using the 1992-1995 average. In the 
basic regression (first column of Table 3), levels of significance for the transparency 
coefficient increase from 95 % (1986-95) to 96.4% (1990-95) to 97.3% (1992-95). 
One referee raised the valuable question of whether transparency might not enhance 
the impact of economic and fiscal variables on approval as well as (conditional on inducing 
greater effort) raising average approval. Testing this requires interacting transparency with 
the economic and fiscal variables. In the fourth column of Table 3 we add unemployment 
interacted with transparency (split into a binary variable between four and five). Indeed, 
where institutions are more transparent the effect of unemployment is bigger by a third. The 
far greater effect, however, is that adding this omitted variable doubles the size of the 
transparency coefficient, from about 1.5 to over 3.  Multicollinearity prevents us from adding 
more (significant) interactions 
A remaining problem concerns the endogeneity of the transparency variable itself. Is 
there is a greater demand for fiscal transparency in states where, for example, there is bigger 
government? Fiscal institutions are endogenous to some degree, particularly to past fiscal 
outcomes, but institutions are also somewhat difficult to change, so they can be considered 
predetermined, “at least in the short-to-medium run” (Alesina and Perotti 1999, 15), which is 





fiscal transparency directly impossible. Indirect approaches are problematic, as the authors 
see no obvious way to instrument for transparency in the context of the US states. 
Another referee proposed the interesting "endogeneity" conjecture that the apparent 
relationships between transparency, scale, and approval are all the result of a common link to 
a prior variable. Indeed, as he/she argued, the American Progressive tradition stresses budget 
reform (transparency), government activism (scale), and confidence that a professionalized 
government can solve problems (trust).  Do states with a Progressive tradition have the 
attributes that follow from it, even if there is no causal relationship among the attributes 
themselves? To obtain an answer we coded the "Progressive tradition" in 7 or 8 ways, 
including their maximum vote in statewide elections, whether they ever elected a member of 
Congress, and so on. Unfortunately only one formulation gave any result at all: whether the 
state was one of three that elected a Progressive governor at some point.  This significantly 
predicts larger scale of government (the referee is right so far) but not greater popularity nor 
transparency, nor does including Progressive tradition diminish the transparency results 
reported in Table 2. So while we would have been delighted to find in the Progressive 
tradition an instrument for transparency, this aspect of the endogeneity problem still requires 
further work. 
Concluding Remarks 
For a cross-section of American states, we find that fiscal transparency matters for economic 
and political outcomes. Moreover, we find that institutions, most notably those defining the 
transparency of the budget process, affect the popularity, or average job performance ratings, 
of state governors in the long run. More fiscal transparency is, on average and controlling for 
other influential factors, associated with a larger scale of government and higher governor 
popularity. We interpret this as favorable evidence for the model of accountability put 





that the endogeneity problem concerning fiscal institutions at the state level has not yet been 
solved. The endogeneity problem, best solved by obtaining reliable time series data on fiscal 
institutions, remains an important issue for future research. 
Given the widespread interest in direct democracy and our initial interpretation of 
initiatives as a "substitute transparency device," the fact that our initiative variables do not 
appear to have the same effects as the transparency measures is worth a comment. The 
presence of initiatives had a positive (but insignificant) effect on popularity and no effect (or 
negative) on fiscal scale. Here is a possible interpretation. Suppose we assume that interest 
groups can influence voters at some cost, so that in those states where initiatives exist, the 
interest groups bargaining with legislators can threaten to use this outside option and win an 
initiative (Feldmann 1998). Then, Feldmann argues, politicians get fewer contributions from 
the interest groups. That is, rents to politicians go down, other things equal, since rents to 
interest groups go up. Of course, accountability also goes down, since the connection 
between the vote (for politicians) and outcomes is weakened. In terms of effort, therefore, the 
first-order effect of an initiative is that politicians' effort goes down (less rents) but there is a 
second-order effect that effort goes up, in the sense that politicians now have to work harder 
to get a vote, since the vote return on effort is lower.  
This may seem like a long shot, but from other data we find that in states where there 
is an initiative there is indeed also less corruption, other things equal.
10 This is indeed a way 
of saying there are less rents to politicians (the first-order effect) because the interest groups 
get them. However, as we saw in Table 2, where there are initiatives there is also more 
average popularity, possibly directly because there are less rents or indirectly because there is 
more effort. In the latter case, if the second-order effect dominates, politicians work harder 
even though they get less per unit effort. Voters in turn like this and respond with higher job 





presence of initiatives has no (or only an ambiguous) effect on fiscal scale, because the less 
accountability effect undoes the effect of more effort or trust. This is a purely empirical 
result. There is more effort but the connection between vote and outcome is weakened so the 
overall effect on fiscal scale is zero, as it happens. Needless to say, firming up all these 
connections will also be an exciting project! 
Finally, given that transparency influences gubernatorial popularity and the scale of 
government, the next question is to what extent does fiscal transparency actually clarify 
responsibility? We hinted at a result with the unemployment interaction reported above, but 
could not get further in this data.  Lowry, Alt and Ferree (1998) showed that electoral 
accountability was lower in elections following divided government, as economic outcomes 
were more difficult to attribute to either branch of government. Future extensions of that 
work will investigate whether fiscal transparency also assists voters in assigning 









Data and Sources 
 
 Source 
Fiscal transparency index  Constructed from NASBO (1995, 1999) and NCOSL (1998) 
Real per capita income  Statistical Abstract of the United States 
Population    Statistical Abstract of the United States 
State Unemployment  Statistical Abstract of the United States 
Regional CPI  Statistical Abstract of the United States 
Government ideology index  Berry et al. (1998) 
Spending/revenue limitations  Poterba and Reuben (1999), Table 8.1 
Balanced budget stringency  Poterba and Reuben (1999), Table 8.1 
Divided government   Council of State Governments, Book of the States 
Initiative rights  Tolbert et al. (1998) 
Term limits  Besley and Case (1995) and http://www.termlimits.org 
Av. no. of initiatives since 
adoption 
Tolbert et al. (1998) 
Initiative signature thresholds  Tolbert et al. (1998) 
Progressive tradition  Gillespie (1993), Appendix 5 
 
The fifteen "Southern" states in our analysis include: AL, AR, FL, GA, KY, LA, MD, MS, 
NC, OK, SC, TN, TX, VA, and WV.   
Statutory initiative states include:
 11 AK, AZ, AR, CA, CO, FL, ID, IL, ME, MA, MI, MO, 
MT, NE, NV, ND, OH, OK, OR, SD, UT, WA, and WY. 
Statutory gubernatorial term limit states include: AL, AK, DE, FL, GA, HI, IN, KS, KY, LA, 









The authors wish to express their appreciation to the editors, two anonymous referees, and 
participants in the Texas A&M Conference for helpful comments. Lassen also thanks the 
EPRU for funding. The activities of EPRU are financed by a grant from the Danish National 
Research Foundation. 
1 See Alesina and Perotti (1996, 1999), Poterba and von Hagen (1999), Tanzi and Schuknecht 
(2000), and World Bank (2000). 
2 Discussion of the (empirical) significance of transparency has emphasized cross-national 
differences. We focus on the sub-national level, where the US states provide a natural testing 
ground for these issues, with broadly similar political structures and cultures and a large 
degree of variation in political and fiscal institutions.  
3 Daunton (1998) also attributes the successful creation of legitimacy and trust in the state in 
Britain after the Napoleonic wars in part to the creation of annual, transparent budgets in 
which “it was clear to the public and taxpayers where money came from and where it was 
going.” (p. 112). Lassen (2000), using a broad index measure of political accountability, finds 
that the scale of government increases in this index on a cross-country sample of democratic 
countries. 
4 For an argument along similar lines, see Roemer (1998). 
5 Donovan and Bowler (1998) find that initiative states have significantly higher debt than 
non-initiative states. 
6 For comparative purposes, there also exist (self-reported) measures of fiscal transparency 
for OECD countries. See Alt, Lassen and Skilling (2000) for an analysis of the effect on 
fiscal balance. Additionally, the IMF Fiscal Transparency Project has collected data from all 
of its members on their financial reporting practices. As far as we know this is not (yet) 





7 For consistency reasons, we omit Alaska and Hawaii. Including them strengthens the 
results. We also tried omitting New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Vermont, as they have 
two-year gubernatorial terms; the results remained unchanged.  
8 Besley and Case (1995) demonstrate that policy outcomes differ depending on whether the 
incumbent governor is term limited or not. We did not consider whether the governors in our 
sample were actually term limited, but only whether a state had statutory term limits or not. 
See the Appendix for a list of term limit states. 
9 We estimated the regression equation set out above, instrumenting the scale of government 
by the government ideology measure from Berry et al. (1998) found to be significant in the 
scale of government regressions above. We used (robust) 2SLS and found estimates and 
levels of significance to be unchanged for transparency, initiatives and spending and revenue 
limits. 
10 We gratefully acknowledge Richard Boylan and Cheryl Long for providing us access to "A 
Survey of State House Reporters' Perception of Public Corruption", available at 
http://economics.wustl.edu/~long/ . 
11 Mississippi adopted the initiative in 1992, but had not yet used it in 1995 (Tolbert et al, 







Alesina, Alberto and Roberto Perotti. 1996. “Fiscal Discipline and the Budget Process.” 
American Economic Review 86:401-407. 
Alesina, Alberto and Roberto Perotti. 1999. “Budget Deficits and Budget Institutions,” in 
Poterba and von Hagen, 13-36. 
Alt, James E. 2001. “Monetary and Fiscal Policy: Exploring Credibility, Transparency, 
Accountability, and Institutions.” Forthcoming in Ira Katznelson and Helen Milner 
(eds.), The State of the Discipline.  
Alt, James E., David Dreyer Lassen and David Skilling. 2000. “Fiscal Transparency and 
Fiscal Policy Outcomes in OECD Countries.” Manuscript, Harvard University, 
October. 
Alt, James E. and Robert C. Lowry. 1994. “Divided Government, Fiscal Institutions, and 
Budget Deficits: Evidence from the States.” American Political Science Review 
88:811-828. 
__________. 2000. “A Dynamic Model of State Budget Outcomes Under Divided Partisan 
Government.” Journal of Politics 62:1035-70. 
Berry, William D., Evan J. Ringquist, Richard C. Fording, and Russell L. Hanson. 1998. 
“Measuring Citizen and Government Ideology in the American States, 1960-93.” 
American Journal of Political Science 42:327-348. 
Besley, Timothy and Anne Case. 1995. “Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic 
Policy Choices? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits.” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 110:769-798. 
Besley, Timothy and Stephen Coate. 2000. “Issue Unbundling via Citizens’ Initiatives.” 





Bowler, Shaun, Todd Donovan and Caroline J. Tolbert (eds.). 1999. Citizens as Legislators: 
Direct Democracy in the United States. Columbus: Ohio State University Press. 
Braithwaite, Valerie and Margaret Levi (eds.). 1998. Trust and Governance. New York: 
Russell Sage Foundation. 
Brennan, Geoffrey. 1998. “Democratic Trust: A Rational-Choice Theory View,” in 
Braithwaite and Levi, 197-217. 
Crain, W. Mark. 2000. “Volatile States: A Mean-Variance Analysis of American Political 
Economy.” Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Economic 
Association, Boston, MA, January. 
Daunton, Martin. 1998. “Trusting Leviathan: British Fiscal Administration from the 
Napoleonic Wars to the Second World War,” in Braithwaite and Levi, 102-134. 
Feldmann, Sven Erik. 1998. Electoral competition, interest group influence and direct 
democracy: three essays in positive political economy. Ph. D dissertation, Harvard 
University. 
Ferejohn, John. 1986. “Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control.” Public Choice 50:2-
25 
Ferejohn, John. 1999. “Accountability and Authority: Towards a Model of Political 
Accountability”, in Przeworski, Manin and Stokes, 131-153. 
Gerber, Elisabeth. 1996. “Legislative Response to Threat of Popular Initiatives.” American 
Journal of Political Science 40:99-128. 
Gillespie, J. David. 1993. Politics at the Periphery: Third Parties in Two-Party America. 
Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. 
Golden, David G. and James M. Poterba. 1980. “The Price of Popularity: The Political 





Hall, Peter A. and Rosemary C. R. Taylor. 1996. “Political Science and the Three New 
Institutionalisms.” Political Studies 44:936-957. 
Hardin, Russell.  Forthcoming. Trust and Trustworthiness.  Manuscript. 
Kopits, George and Steven Symansky. 1998.  “Transparency in Government Operations.” 
IMF Occasional Paper 158. 
Lascher, Edward L. Jr., Michael G. Hagen and Steven A. Rochlin. 1996. “Gun Behind the 
Door? Ballot Initiatives, State Policies and Public Opinion.” Journal of Politics 
58:760-775. 
Lassen, David Dreyer. 2000. “Political Accountability and the Size of Government: Theory 
and Cross-Country Evidence.” EPRU Working Paper 00-20, University of 
Copenhagen. 
Lowry, Robert C. and James E. Alt. 2001. “A Visible Hand? Bond Markets, Political Parties, 
Balanced Budget Laws, and State Government Debt.” Economics and Politics, 
March. 
Lowry, Robert C., James E. Alt and Karen E. Ferree. 1998. “Fiscal Policy Outcomes and 
Electoral Accountability in American States.” American Political Science Review 
92:759-774. 
Lupia, Arthur and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1998. The Democratic Dilemma. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
MacDonald, Jason A. and Lee Sigelman. 1999. “Public Assessments of Gubernatorial 
Performance: A Comparative State Analysis.” American Politics Quarterly 27:201-
15. 
Matsusaka, John G. 1995. “Fiscal Effects of the Voter Initiative: Evidence from the Last 30 





Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria. 2000. “Good, Bad or Ugly? On the Effects of Fiscal Rules with 
Creative Accounting.” IMF Working Paper WP/00/172, October.  
Nadeau, Richard, Richard Niemi, and Antoine Yoshinaka. Forthcoming. “A Cross-national 
Analysis of Economic Voting.” Electoral Studies.  
National Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO). 1995 and 1999. Budget Processes 
in the States. http://www.nasbo.org 
National Conference of State Legislatures (NCOSL). 1998. Legislative Budget Procedures. 
http://www.ncosl.org 
Norpoth, Helmut, Michael Lewis-Beck and Jean-Dominique Lafay (eds.). 1991. Economics 
and Politics: The Calculus of Support. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Paldam, Martin. 1991. “How Robust is the Vote Function? A Study of Seventeen Nations 
over Four Decades,” in Norpoth, Lewis-Beck and Lafay, 9-31. 
Peltzman, Sam. 1992. “Voters as Fiscal Conservatives.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 
107:329-361. 
Poterba, James M. 1994. “State Responses to Fiscal Crisis: The Effects of Budgetary 
Institutions and Politics.” Journal of Political Economy 102:799-821. 
Poterba, James M. and Jürgen von Hagen (eds.). 1999. Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal 
Performance. Chicago: NBER and University of Chicago Press. 
Poterba, James M. and Kim S. Reuben. 1999. “State Fiscal Institutions and the U.S. 
Municipal Bond Market,” in Poterba and von Hagen. 
Powell, G. Bingham and Guy Whitten. 1993. “A Cross-National Analysis of Economic 
Voting”. American Journal of Political Science 37: 391-414. 
Przeworski, Adam, Bernard Manin and Susan C. Stokes (eds.). 1999. Democracy, Account-





Roemer, John E. 1998. “Why the Poor Do Not Expropriate the Rich: An Old Argument in 
New Garb.” Journal of Public Economics 70:399-424. 
Tanzi, Vito and Ludger Schuknecht. 2000. Public Spending in the 20
th Century: A Global 
Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Tolbert, Caroline J., Daniel H. Lowenstein and Todd Donovan. 1999. “Election Law and 
Rules for Using Initiatives,” in Bowler, Donovan and Tolbert, 27-54. 
U.S. Official Job Approval Ratings (USJAR). http://www.unc.edu/~beyle/jars.html 
von Hagen, Jürgen and Ian Harden. 1994. “National Budget Process and Fiscal 
Performance.” European Economy 1994/3:311-418. 
World Bank. 2000. Reforming Public Institutions and Strengthening Governance: A World 
Bank Strategy. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. 
















































Measure  Number of states 
GAAP 17 
Multi-year expenditure forecast  30 
Frequency of budget cycle  26 
Binding revenue estimates  25 
Responsibility for revenue forecast 32 
Single appropriation bill  18 
Non-partisan drafting  15 
Open-ended appropriations  24 
Performance reporting  35 
 
Source of data:  National Association of State Budget Offices (1995, 1999) and National 







Regression Results for Scale of Government and Transparency 
 
 Dependent  variable 

















































































2 0.49  0.45  0.56  0.43 
N  48 48 48 48 
 
Note: Computed using STATA 6.0. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Coefficients 







Regression Results for Popularity and Transparency 
 






  3.380*** 
(1.014) 
Initiative rights    3.278 
(2.74) 
  
Spending limits      5.313* 
(3.118) 
 
Revenue limits      6.845** 
(2.849) 
 






















     -1.373*** 
(0.526) 





















































































2 0.62  0.59  0.64  0.67 
N 48  48  48  48 
 
Note: Computed using STATA 6.0. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Coefficients 
statistically significant at the 99% level are denoted ***, at 95% by **, and at 90% by *. 
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